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Medicaid has never been a popular program. It has from
its inception been an expensive social commitment, demand-
ing larger, although not always proportionately larger,
shares of the state and federal budgets for nearly two
decades. It has been saddled with a welfare-designed struc-
ture, thereby ensuring inherent inequities in the distribution
of benefits. It lacks the support of an enfranchised constitu-
ency; indeed, in pragmatic terms, the only true Medicaid
constituency is made up of the state governments which
distribute Medicaid funds and the medical care providers
who receive them-support which is largely for the purpose
of securing the flow of those funds, not for the achievement
of Medicaid's programmatic goals.'
Thus Medicaid and its costs have been problematic
issues for both Congress and the state legislatures since the
first program dollar was spent in 1966. Medicaid has sparked
annual debates, periodic rounds of budget and program cuts,
and virtually continual but largely unsuccessful attempts at
program reform. As a result, until 1980, political critics
insisted on describing Medicaid as a national dilemma-both
a product and a cause of the larger inflationary spiral in
medical care costs-defying resolution in the face of intense-
ly complicated but nonetheless deadlocked political pres-
sures. Fiscal conservatives have resisted attempts to expand
Medicaid even to make it more effective; providers were
equally resistant to proposals to make it more efficient;
liberal politics, supported by state government and provider
lobbyists, held firm on the broader commitment that the
program represented. Only at the budgetary margins and
over piecemeal modifications were battles won and lost,
representing no discernible overall policy direction.2
With the election of President Reagan in 1980, however,
the log jam was finally broken. Under Reagan's prodding,
Congress subjected Medicaid to a series of cost-limiting
modifications which have altered not only the structure of
the program but also the underlying philosophy.
In 1981 the level of federal financial support for the
program was scheduled for a series of limitations beginning
with a 3 per cent reduction of the federal share of program
costs in FY 1982, to be followed by a 4 per cent reduction in
FY 1983, and a 4 1/2 per cent reduction in FY 1984. The
federal requirements for states that opted to maintain a
program for the medically needy were substantially reduced.
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State discretion was also expanded with regard to limits on
the "freedom of choice," restrictions on provider reim-
bursements, and in a variety of other ways generally reduc-
ing federal oversight of the program and allowing the states
considerably more flexibility in modifying or curtailing their
programs.2
In 1982, Congress again loosened the federal require-
ments for state Medicaid programs and mandated another
$300 million in program spending reductions, further ex-
panding state discretion and signaling a growing federal
tolerance for state program reductions and limitations, toler-
ance that was re-emphasized by the Department of Health
and Human Services' administrative implementation of the
various changes adopted by the 97th Congress.2
The political genius of these program limitations is that
the policy dilemma that Medicaid had long represented to
Congress was adroitly resolved: by 1983, $3 billion in federal
expenditures had been quickly eliminated, whereas in past
years Medicaid cost inflation had been begrudgingly but
consistently absorbed. Substantial Medicaid reform, at least
from the point of view of the federal budget, had been
achieved-and, not incidentally, in a manner that avoided
federal responsibility for mandating any specific program
changes or reductions.
The political fallout, of course, has been hardly a policy
resolution but a shift of the burden of Medicaid reform from
the shoulders of federal officials to those of state legislators
and program administrators. Except for its impact on the
federal budget, the current and future status of the Medicaid
program has only been outlined by the federal program
amendments of the last several years; the real implications of
those changes and their full impact can only be assessed as
each state reacts to its newly granted discretion and inherit-
ed fiscal responsibility.
So far, most states have gone through several rounds of
program changes in their efforts to absorb their share of the
reduced federal support. Some states-but only a few-have
taken the opportunity to attempt some rather ambitious
Medicaid reforms. Other states-and the vast majority-
have turned to program reductions, directly reducing eligibil-
ity or services, imposing limitations on utilization, or reduc-
ing provider reimbursement.3 The outcome of the various
state program changes on the lives of Medicaid recipients or,
for that matter, on state budgets cannot yet be quantified,
but it is hard to predict that states will be successful,
however that success is measured. Containing Medicaid
costs, even under the pressure of financial incentives to do
so, has proven to be a difficult task in the past. Despite the
widespread belief that Medicaid can be administered more
effectively or efficiently, efforts to do so have had limited,
anecdotal success.4-6 Even eligibility and service limitations
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may prove to create only temporary reductions in expendi-
tures and may even increase demand for more expensive
services as people spend down to eligibility or as their
conditions deteriorate. Only the most draconian service or
eligibility reductions, e.g., the elimination of the medically
needy program, can be safely predicted to result in the
immediate "big dollar" savings currently required of state
programs. The problem of fashioning acceptable Medicaid
reform strategies is further complicated by a kind of political
"Hawthorne effect"-the immediate reaction of Medicaid
recipients or, more importantly, providers of medical serv-
ices to reductions in provider reimbursement or other cost-
limiting changes in Medicaid programs may only be short-
lived and, therefore, the human and dollar impact of these
strategies is inevitably speculative and subject to change.
Thus it must be predicted that most states will find
affirmative Medicaid program reform exceedingly difficult to
achieve and that direct or de facto program reductions, and
only those of substantial proportions, are certain to result in
the immediate and lasting Medicaid cost limitations that are
required by the recent federal funding reductions.
This rather pessimistic assessment of the likely conse-
quences of the Reagan-era Medicaid changes is further
buttressed by two unfortunate political realities:
0 The federal Medicaid program reductions have fallen
on the states in concert with the increased financial and
administrative burdens of virtually every other domestic
spending program. A deft shift of responsibility to the states
was hardly a strategy confined to Medicaid. From education
to highway construction, from social services to economic
development, state and local governments are now shoulder-
ing the immediate and demanding burdens of Reagan's New
Federalism. Even under more prosperous conditions these
would hardly be circumstances under which most states
could be expected to follow the risky course of implementing
effective or innovative Medicaid reforms. Under current
economic and political circumstances, most state officials-
beleaguered by the demands of more popular programs, the
state's taxpayers, underpaid state employees and the like-
will be unable or unwilling to trade the more certain results
of program reductions for the unpredictable results of pro-
gram innovation or reform.
* The federal program reductions, whatever their im-
pact, may represent only the first round of federal Medicaid
funding cuts that states must absorb. Again, it is necessary
to view Medicaid in the context of the overall Reagan
strategy of which Medicaid reform is only one part. Having
complied with Reagan's demands for immediate individual
and business tax reductions and substantial increases in
military appropriations-political commitments that once
made will prove hard to revoke-and having compromised
on reductions in Social Security and related income transfer
payments, the 97th Congress virtually set by default current
and future policy for all other domestic spending. Medicaid,
second only to Medicare as the largest portion of the
remaining domestic spending budget, was the inevitable
target of the $40-50 billion budget reductions required to
meet the tightly drawn budget projections and political
commitments demanded by President Reagan of the 97th
Congress. Indeed, it is a commentary on the continuing
support for Medicaid that the cuts enacted during the 97th
Congress were limited to those outlined above.
But assuming that the political postures of the President
and the Congress are not notably altered, a similar political
scenario may well unfold in the next several years. If
additional reductions in federal spending are politically man-
dated, Medicaid will once again be the obvious target of
would-be budget cutters. One need look no further than the
projection for a nearly inconceivable federal budget deficit of
$200 billion by 1984 to predict that pressure for further
spending reductions will be substantial.
Some political observers are discounting such predic-
tions, finding Congress more reluctant to extract further cuts
in such programs as Medicaid. Certainly the politics of the
98th Congress, as they can be assessed thus far, indicate a
return to the days of compromise and incremental adjust-
ments, rather than the major program reform and the other
broad-brush changes that characterized those of the 97th
Congress and the first years of the current Administration.
And notwithstanding the leviathan budget deficits, the na-
tional economy has recently shown a few tentative signs of
improvement, thereby reducing some of the pressure on
federal as well as state and local officials to pursue further
Medicaid program reductions.
On the other hand, it is fairly clear that the Administra-
tion's rhetoric for the election of 1984 will echo that of 1980.
Mr. Reagan will once again describe his political dreams for
a New America to a nation that responded so favorably once
before, and ask to be given a chance to finish the job he has
only started. If so, and if his blue print for economic
recovery has not much changed, then the prospects for
further rounds of federal Medicaid reductions may extend
well into the late 1980s. Even if Reagan is not re-elected, the
political climate created by his Administration may not be
totally reversed and the prospects for securing a renewed
federal commitment to maintaining the Medicaid program
will not necessarily improve. What is needed, of course, is a
reaffirmation-first by the nation's voters and then by their
elected representatives-of the social commitment that
Medicaid has long represented. Maintaining an adequate
medical care benefits program for the poor at an acceptable
cost is a political dilemma that should not be resolved by
redefining the underlying commitment to the poor, but by
leadership and direction in containing the costs of that
commitment. The spiraling cost of medical care is, after all, a
major component of inflation in the economy, and is respon-
sible for the parallel crisis in maintaining the Medicare
program and other federal health programs. Federal leader-
ship need not be reminded that it will have little choice but to
address that problem; and while neither Reagan and his
conservative advisors, nor his predecessors who followed
more liberal strategies, have been noticeably successful in
their efforts to curb medical cost inflation, it seems particu-
larly cruel to sacrifice the Medicaid-reliant population as we
await the emergence of a political consensus from the long-
running debates on medical care cost containment.
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